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The Interlacing of Science and
Ethics




1 Richard  Rorty  has  long  been  perceived  and  interpreted  as  a  provocative  and
groundbreaking philosopher. It is no coincidence that much of the literature on him
still focuses on an unresolved conception of the two commitments – materialist and
hermeneutic – that characterize his philosophical perspective. However, upon closer
examination,  an  approach  that  he  calls  “eirenic”  emerges  in  his  writings.1 This
eirenism should not be confused with a form of sophisticated relativism (Putnam 1992);
rather,  it  is  a  consequence  of  the  profound  anti-foundational  conviction  and  anti-
authoritarian sentiment that feeds his thought, as well as his reading of the relation of
science and ethics. My hypothesis is that this strategy of holding together unresolved
aspects of  philosophical  perspectives is  emblematic of  his  pragmatist  hermeneutics,
which  applies  especially  to  Rorty’s  conception  of  science  and  morality,  and  their
interlaced  relation.  In  this  article,  I  focus  on  Rorty’s  recovery  of  pragmatism  and
“pragmatist hermeneutics” by considering his understanding of science and ethics as
deeply interlaced. Rorty’s perspective on this issue is deeply inspired by Dewey’s and
James’s conception of a holistic-syncretic pragmatism in addition to a methodological-
scientific  one.  By  focusing  on  Rorty’s  conception  of  science  and  ethics  and  its
philosophical  implications,  it  is  possible  to recapitulate  his  cultural  project  of  an
organic (anti-dichotomic) re-modulation of the objectivity-solidarity relationship. By
reassessing  the  notion  that  human  beings  are  existentially  committed  to  any
vocabulary they adopt, Rorty’s project takes into account not only the main cultural
trends of logical empiricism and continental philosophy, but also the existential needs
they conveyed – that is, the search for objectivity and the meaning of life, respectively.
The Rortyan proposal of an anti-ideological, historicist or post-positivist reformulation
of the conception of scientific rationality as not opposed to ethics seems to be in line
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with Jamesian efforts to confront scientific dogmatism by questioning the key notion of
truth. In this way, by following Kuhn’s historicism, Rorty, like James, arrives at a sort of
pragmatist hermeneutics: within a naturalistic hermeneutical framework, Rorty contests
on an ontological level the need for necessary connections or disconnections between
moral and scientific discourse. In this sense, the conception of ethics as having to do
with what is personal, historical and “irrational” contrasts with the notion of scientific
rationality  elaborated  in  modernity  as  something  that,  unlike  morality,  is  able  to
escape human finitude and contingency.
 
2. Scientific or Holistic-Syncretic Pragmatism?
2 In his introduction to Sellars’ text, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Rorty focuses
his attention on the theme of rationality and the prejudice established in modernity
about scientific rationality as amoral and impersonal. If Quine should be credited with
challenging  the  rationalist  version  of  foundationalism  –  i.e.,  his  criticism  of  the
analytic/synthetic distinction – it is, instead, to Sellars that we owe the dissolution of
the  empiricist  version  of  foundationalism,  with  his  criticism  of  the  “distinction
between what is ‘given to the mind’ and what is ‘added by the mind’” (Rorty 1997: 5).
Rorty quotes in full Sellars’ famous passage (§ 38) in which he clarifies what rational
empirical  (and  scientific)  knowledge  means:  “empirical  knowledge,  like  its
sophisticated extension, science, is rational not because it has a foundation but because
it is a self-correcting enterprise” (Sellars 1997: 5-6). From this maxim, Rorty concludes
that the notion of rationality and specifically of scientific rationality does not rest on
the implementation of codified methods, but consists, instead, in the “give-and-take
participation in a cooperative social project” (Rorty 1997: 6). These passages are pivotal
to  understanding  Rorty’s  recovery  of  pragmatism  and  his  attempt  to  draw
“consequences from a pragmatist theory about truth” (CP: xiii). Rorty praises the
classical pragmatists for their desire to change the philosophical vocabulary still used
within this genre. The burden of finding a path between moving away from philosophy
and remaining locked within its vocabulary, and thus having to accept preconceived
meanings,  is  resolved  by  an  effort  to  pragmatically  reinterpret  philosophy  and  its
ambiguous key terms like truth, goodness, and rationality. Pragmatism represents a
third  way  between  Platonism  and  positivism  because  it  questions  their  common
assumptions: in particular, the very notion of truth as (adequate) correspondence to
reality.  To  dismiss  this  notion  of  truth  is  also  to  abandon  its  implicit  alternative
conceptions of reality – namely that natural science may or may not be the only truth
to be had.
3 Rorty reads the pragmatists’ conception of philosophy in the light of Sellars’s broad
definition  of  philosophy as  a  way  of  seeing  how things  hang  together.  Pointing  at
“being anti-Philosophical” (CP: xvii) as a new way of doing philosophy pragmatists are
more radical than empiricists for their instrumental understanding of knowledge and
true knowledge as something that helps to cope with reality. Pragmatism cuts across
traditional  distinctions,  demonstrating  a  natural  (and  sound)  oscillation  between
science and idealism. These two tendencies are adopted in different contexts and for
both generalist and specialized audiences – that is, the general public and professional
philosophers.  Peirce, James and Dewey all  assumed the “experimental” model (ORT:
63)2 in an attempt to emancipate American culture from its religious conditioning of
The Interlacing of Science and Ethics
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-1 | 2020
2
moral  and  political  reflection.  Their  scientific  attitude  is  not,  however,  entirely
reducible to hard forms of positivism because of their complementary holistic view.
Jamesian anti-atomism, Peirce’s semiotic approach, and Dewey’s instrumentalism are
explicit expressions of the anti-reductionist stance supporting pragmatist naturalism.
4 Looking  at  the  contemporary  situation,  Rorty  interprets  the  disappearance  of
pragmatism in  U.S.  universities,  starting  around the  mid-twentieth  century,  as  the
result of a losing polarization between Carnapian empiricism and a growing fascination
with continental philosophy, regarded as more profound than its naïve American rival.
Despite critiques by authors such as Bernstein, who see Rorty (like Dewey) as suffering
from a certain lack of concreteness in addressing social and political issues (Bernstein
2003: 135), Rorty considers Dewey’s anti-ideological liberalism as “the most valuable
tradition of American intellectual life” (ORT: 64) and praises intellectuals like Sidney
Hook  for  their  efforts  in  keeping  such  a  tradition  alive.  Given  Hook’s  and  Rorty’s
common goal, however, Rorty suggests a different strategy from Hook’s “identification
of liberalism with ‘being scientific’” (ORT: 64). Rorty does not agree with emphasizing
the scientific side of pragmatism while disregarding its equally relevant holistic side,
which consists in the recognition of the “continuity between science, art, politics, and
religion” (ORT: 64). His confrontation with Hook’s thesis is particularly interesting in
that it deepens his understanding of the scientific method. By focusing on an analysis
of what scientism and the scientific method mean, and trying to promote a sort of
coexistence between analytic and continental thought within a perspective informed
primarily  by  American  pragmatism,  Rorty  shows  that  many  anachronisms  and
misunderstandings  about  pragmatism  can  be  overcome.  More  specifically,  making
room again for the “holistic and syncretic side” of pragmatism, in particular, that of
Jamesian  and  Deweyan origin,  allows  contemporary  pragmatically-oriented  authors
both to regain credibility in the eyes of post-positivist philosophers of science – like
Kuhn and Quine – and to minimize unnecessary or rather ideological opposition to the
continental tradition. To put it briefly, Rorty adopts a non-ideological attitude that is
thoroughly “experimental F05BandF05D  fallibilist” (ORT: 66) to encourage new pragmatists to
actively participate in contemporary philosophical conversations.3
5 Neatly  distinguishing  the  logic  of  the  scientific  method  from  the  choice  of  the
theoretical frame of reference,4 Hook’s understanding of pragmatism turns out to be
strongly  positivistic  and  thus  only  partially  connected  with  Dewey’s  notion  of  the
scientific method5 and his instrumental conception of the ever-changing relationship
between means,  evaluations  and meta-reflections  of  value  judgements.  The  holistic
aspect so disregarded by Hook is instead the ripest fruit of scientific practice, in which
classical  pragmatists  were  almost  all  trained.  Such  practice  proves  it  difficult  to
identify and contrast facts and objective data with human “takings” (ORT: 65), i.e. the
value frames within which scientists read and interpret data. Rorty reads Hook’s thesis,
according to which “there is only one reliable method of reaching the truth about the
nature  of  things  anywhere  and  at  any  time,”  as  a  definition  of  “scientism,”  while
sharing his conception of “naturalism” as “a philosophy [that] not only accepts this
method but also the broad generalizations which are established by the use of it” (ORT:
65). In this regard, Rorty privileges as the most stimulating proposal of pragmatism its
effort  to  break  away  from  foundational  logic  by  challenging  the  notion  that  truth
corresponds  to  the  most  accurate  description  of  the  nature  of  things.  Pragmatists
assume a behaviourist, evolutionist and historicist stance whereby “true beliefs” are in
Jamesian terms “successful rules for action” (ORT: 65).6 Conversely, Hook’s insistence
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on the universal validity of the scientific method is therefore the result of a stance that
is  only  partially  pragmatist.  In  addition,  as  the  opposition  between  truth-as-
correspondence and truth-as-non-correspondence is  pragmatically  rejected,  there is
another  temptation  to  escape.  The  temptation  is  to  re-propose  the  same  non-
pragmatist opposition in the context of rationality by appealing to what distinguishes a
rational perspective from an irrational one, a distinction that can be drawn on the basis
of  a  contingent  preconception  that  the  naturalistic-materialist  understanding  is
rational while the anti-naturalistic-religious one is irrational. Hook’s appealing to the
logic of the scientific method to maintain the gap between science and theology turns
out to be very far from what I claim to be Rorty’s Jamesian view, according to which
rationality is not the exclusive prerogative of naturalistic philosophies.
6 In order to corroborate the Jamesian notion of legitimate alternative “webs of beliefs”
(ORT: 66), Rorty recovers Quine’s conception of the continuous reorganization of our
systems of knowledge. Quine’s and James’s idea is that the same “evidence,” the same
“data” or “fact,” can be included in very different networks of beliefs, reconfiguring the
internal balance of our field of experience as appropriate. According to Rorty, however,
this  conception,  which  would  be  tantamount  to  renouncing  the  idea  of  truth as
correspondence, leads neither to considering facts from a holistic perspective in which
they  do  not  constitute  an  undisputed  and  neutral  background  against  which  it  is
possible to establish a priori methodological criteria7 for rationally comparing divergent
positions, nor to falling into relativism: “[i]f one drops the idea that there is a common
ground called ‘the evidence,’ one is still far from saying that one person’s web is as
good as another” (ORT: 67).
7 One fact neither proves nor disproves a theory. In this sense, it is not impossible to
choose rationally  between “alternative,  equally  coherent,  webs  of  belief”  (ORT:  66).
Relativism for Rorty, as for James, is an option that belongs to the same absolutist view,
as its exact opposite. More interesting, instead, is the uncertain social process by which
consensus  can emerge  over  complex  issues  during  discussions  in  which alternative
perspectives  collide.  The  consensus  is  not  obtained  by  employing  prepackaged
solutions that cannot be further corrected, but it does emerge gradually – says Rorty –
through a “reweaving” of the systems of knowledge at stake. The outcome of bringing
the old beliefs into agreement with the new ones, a process for which the empirical
instrument of reweaving one’s “web of beliefs” does not imply the need to “formulate
epistemic principles”  (ORT:  68),  is  far  from being fully  predictable.  In  other words,
fallibilism  does  not  necessarily  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  possession  of  universal
methodological conceptions and principles. 
8 In this regard, Rorty recovers Dewey’s experimentalism in the moral sphere and brings
it closer to Kuhn’s perspective on science. Like Kuhn, who reads the history of science
as a history of scientific revolutions, i.e. of slow and decisive changes in immeasurable
paradigms,  Rorty  understands  vocabularies  as  alternative  frameworks  to  be  chosen
according to  purposes  considered to  be convenient  for  a  human society  in  a  given
historical period.8 According to this idea, if we consider epistemic principles as a kind
of  moral  principle,  we can see how both moral  and scientific  problems historically
imply the need for continuous re-description based on the results of the applying these
same principles to the specific features of the “problematic situation” we are facing –
that is, to the concrete novelties we happen to find in nature.9 Rorty fully recovers the
dynamics  of  Dewey’s  organic  circuit,  a  logical  device  in  which  the  concrete
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achievement of goals or the implementation of new means contributes to telling us
what  we  are  looking  for,  what  we  desire.  In  morality  as  in  science,  the  necessary
application  to  concrete  situations  and the  intervention  of  temporality,  required  by
every  organic  and  social  process,  play  an  indispensable  role:  it  is  not  a  matter  of
comparing static conceptual paradigms, already given once and for all, but of following
the  development  of  moral  and  scientific  progress  and  reconstructing  adequate
descriptions  of  the  specific  “problematic  situation.”  For  Rorty  descriptions  will
contribute to “changes, thus changing the ‘observation language’ used to describe the
‘evidence’” (ORT: 68).
 
3. Reshaping the Debate on Method in the Social
Sciences
9 This  interweaving  of  facts  and  values  shows  how  methodological  matters  are  thus
connected with the traditional conception of truth as correspondence and therefore,
ultimately,  with  the  ontological  claim  recovered  in  the  modern  world.  Rorty
hypothesizes  that  modern scientific  discoveries  did  not  have as  their  objective any
“epistemological moral” (CP: 191) since they did not intend to establish the “nature of
science  or  rationality”  and,  above  all,  that  such  discoveries  were  not  the  result  of
adopting  the  scientific  method.  As  anticipated,  in  modern  philosophy,  and  in  its
attempt to answer the foundational question of why science is so successful, Rorty sees
the  emergence  of  a  tradition  of  thought  based  on  the  Galilean  metaphor  drawn
between the discovery of the isomorphism in terms of scientific reductionism and the
natural world: the well-known idea that the book of nature is written in mathematical
characters.  Galileo’s  claim  to  have  found  not  just  one language  among  the  many
through which nature can be interpreted but the original language of nature – and
therefore  to  have  breached  the  secret  constitution  of  nature  itself  –  was  the
foundational link between nature and language that characterized and was elaborated
by modern philosophy. This link became the premise on which to develop a series of
rationalist,  empirical,  and transcendental  theories that explained the success of  the
isomorphic hypothesis: the idea of a key vocabulary that opens the lock of the universe.
10
10 This idea reflects the classical idea of truth as correspondence to, or perfect agreement
with,  reality,  which  Jamesian  and  Deweyan  pragmatism,  in  particular,  has  tried  to
undermine, questioning the pragmatist meaning of “correspondence”11 and insisting
on  the  contextual  dimension  and  inherent  value  of  any  conception  of  truth.  The
distinction between science and non-science has long remained mired in the opposition
between  idealists  and  positivists  or,  to  adopt  James’s  slightly  different
conceptualization, between the “tender-minded” and “tough-minded.” In Rorty’s view,
convinced of  the legitimacy of  the correspondence between scientific  language and
reality,  the  latter  have  tried  to  correct  the  extreme  outcomes  of  transcendental
idealism – namely, the construction of alternative linguistic worlds – by referring to
the use of the notion of method, and the related notions of objectivity and rigour. In
classic pragmatist style, the figures of Dewey and Kuhn stand out in Rorty’s history of
the philosophy of science and social science for having suggested a third conception of
science, different from those derived from the common foundationalist ontology that
holds firm on the point of univocal thought-language-reality isomorphism, even if seen
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from  the  alternative  perspectives  of  positivism  and  idealism.  According  to  Rorty,
confidence in the scientific method goes hand in hand with the idea that essences of
nature, reason, and mind exist. If one begins with essences, it is possible to ascertain
some method to  lead us  to  the  real  knowledge of  things  beyond their  appearance.
Modernity  conceived  a  notion  of  science  that  cultivated  such  an  idea  of  truth  as
univocal correspondence to reality. This idea was indifferent to the time and place in
which, and interests and purposes for which, correspondence is recognized; in short, it
disregarded the operational and value framework concerning truth.
11 The legitimate question about the moral value of the success of the scientific method in
the  history  of  science  should,  therefore,  in  Rorty’s  view,  be  met  with  a  somewhat
disillusioning answer. The Galilean method, although undoubtedly a good idea, held no
profound secret: it did no more than to ultimately function well, indeed better than
other methods. Nevertheless, there is nothing special or even specific in the empirical
method: it  is  precisely the same empirical  method currently applied in many other
human activities. Included among its other procedures are “check[ing] off examples
against criteria; […] fudg[ing] the counter-examples enough to avoid the need for new
models; […and] try[ing] out various guesses, formulated within the current jargon, in
the hope of coming up with something which will cover the unfudgeable cases” (CP:
193). In this sense, according to Letson, Rorty substantially agrees with “Quine’s quip
that science organizes common sense” (Letson 1995: 44). For Rorty the secret was in
Galileo’s vocabulary: his terminology “lucked out” by proving to be more convenient
than Aristotle’s in that historical context and mentality. The history of the philosophy
of science in fact derives from the metaphysical moral lesson that philosophers drew
from  scientific  success.  As  Hernández recently  stated,  “what  Rorty  calls  Galilean
axiological neutrality becomes a metaphysical process which screens subjective aspects
of our descriptions, even if it is unclear in the history of science which general but not
trivial procedures compose such a method” (Hernández 2017: 2). In short, instead of
inferring the importance of the mathematical jargon in which one frames scientific
hypotheses,  modern philosophers focused on the capacity of the new vocabulary to
describe nature in its proper terms, to describe its essence.
12 Given  that  some  historians  of  modern  philosophy  questioned  Rorty’s  “simplistic
interpretation” of modern thinkers, many (with some important exceptions, see Taylor
1995) accept the relevance of his “history of modern philosophy […] in its focus on the
centrality of the epistemology of representations and the role such epistemology has
played  in  defining  a  distinct  and  privileged  place  for  philosophy  as  a  cognitive
authority” (see  Gutting  2003:  43).  That  is  why  it  is  interesting  to  deepen  our
understanding of the reasons or rather the misleading interpretations that, according
to Rorty, would account for the outcome that philosophy became a cognitive authority.
There are two significant misunderstandings that still  inform the role that common
sense  plays  in  scientific  research  today:  first,  the  idea  that  the  scientificity  of  a
hypothesis is proportionate to its “moral insignificance” and, second, that a hypothesis
represents  reality  inasmuch as  it  can  be  generalized  –  that  is,  it  does  not  present
references to subjective notions (see infra CP: 193-4). These are the two modern criteria
that have contributed to validating the myth of the neutrality of science and its method
in the search for “an absolute conception of reality,” as Rorty quotes from Williams.
This Cartesian confidence in a sort of human power to grasp the self-representation of
nature becomes the battleground between philosophers like Williams, who believe that
this representation is “one of our intuitions about the nature of knowledge,” and Rorty,
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for whom it is instead “one of our intuitions about what counts as being philosophical”
(CP: 194). In his view, it is not only an epistemological but a moral intuition, as is made
evident  by  the  Cartesian  ambition  of  obtaining  neutral  and  universally  valid
generalizations.  The  post-Cartesian  interpretation  of  the  scientific  method  has,
therefore, deeply marked its destiny in modernity, determining its success. In the light
of  a  rationalistic  comprehension  of  nature,  this  interpretation  contributed  to
establishing the supposed neutral  status of  science,  making the scientific  method a
means of not only ordering thought (as it was for Bacon), but selecting purely natural
elements. This is the reason why, according to Rorty, modern philosophy did nothing
but continue, in this sense, to cultivate the Platonic dream of being able to discover and
recognize “Nature’s Own Vocabulary” (CP: 194) – a dream Rorty rejects in keeping with
his  espousal  of  the  pragmatist  tradition,  which,  as  Peirce’s  anti-Cartesian  essays12 
already demonstrate,  clearly denies  humans the possibility  of  having an immediate
intuition, intellectual or sensible, of reality.
13 Thus,  the  effect  of  the  penetration  of  Cartesian  philosophy  into  science  led  to
epistemically confusing “parts of one’s mind which do and don’t correspond to reality
[…] with the distinction between rational and irrational ways of doing science” (CP:
194).  Rorty,  however,  considers  two  ways  of  understanding  this  correspondence
between  cognitive  abilities  and  scientific  method:  an  anti-foundational  way  and  a
foundational one. On the one hand, in the wake of Kuhn and Dewey, Rorty considers
the notions of method and rationality as names that indicate a well-balanced attitude
in research activity between not giving up the intensity of one’s sensations and the
need for intersubjective discussion. On the other hand, following what Rorty criticizes
as “epistemologically-centered philosophy” (CP: 195), the same two notions pretend to
be neutral descriptions of an essential correspondence between the human mind and
the language of nature. In this sense, the idea of the scientific method is inevitably
linked  to  an  “absolute  conception”,  namely  an  objective  and  purely  descriptive
conception, of reality.
14 As underlined by several scholars,  Rorty is  mainly opposed to “scientific realism,”13
which for Rouse may be explained as the philosophical claim that “science aims, and
often succeeds, at developing theories that are true in the specific philosophical sense
of a correspondence between the content of linguistic expressions and the ‘way the
world is’  independent of  human concepts or practices” (Rouse 2003:  82).  Moreover,
according  to  Rouse,  this  realist  view  of  science  goes  hand  in  hand  with  a  certain
conception of morality: “[l]ike moralists seeking natural, rational, or divine authority
for their recommendations […s]cience, as realists conceive it, aims for and supposedly
attains something greater (and more reliable) than do other, all-too-human activities”
(Rouse 2003: 82). According to this view, by rejecting both the notion of the scientific
method  and  that  of  an  “objective”  moral  theory  as inutile  and  impossible,14
respectively,  Rorty  proves  to  be  favourable  to  a  hermeneutic  understanding of  the
sciences (including the social sciences) and morality. Moreover, his taking part in the
debate between “value-neutral” scientific models and “hermeneutical” models in the
social sciences aims at shedding light on a deeper level of confusion that, in his opinion,
affects the protagonists of the debate themselves. Their problem is that both factions,
scientific  realists  and  hermeneutists,  focus  on  a  methodological  issue,  while  Rorty
recognizes  that,  since  they  cannot  dissolve  the  Deweyan  means-ends  circuit,  this
debate inevitably affects the goals of social research, not only the methods adopted. In
order  to  resolve  the  situation,  Rorty  proposes  to  frame the  discussion  in  terms  of
The Interlacing of Science and Ethics
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-1 | 2020
7
Dilthey’s famous distinction as a quarrel between “the competing goals of ‘explanation’
and  ‘understanding’”  (CP:  196).  Above  all,  he  wishes  to  modulate  the  issue  by
addressing  the  difference  between  the  types  of  “jargon”  that  characterize  the  two
descriptive  styles.  Rorty  emphasizes  how  both  styles,  identified  as  Galilean  and
teleological, or generalizing and evaluative, imply an already-made choice to commit to
a specific human interest or purpose: hence scientific realists chose to neglect while
hermeneutists chose to valorize the evaluative dimension of the adopted vocabulary.
15 Rorty displays an “eirenic” attitude here, which we will see in a moment when briefly
mentioning  his  view  of  morality,  in  which  he  confronts  Freud’s  materialistic  and
hermeneutic  reading.  Indeed,  for  Rorty,  from  a  perspective  that  we  prefer  to  call
pluralist and genuinely organic in the Deweyan sense, this difference in vocabularies,
which also occurs in the social sciences, is not one that should be solved but instead
accepted. In  the  social  sciences,  the  close  connection  between  means  and  ends  is
evident, as is the actual interaction between scientific and moral “goals,” namely the
ability to predict broad phenomena and the question of how to choose a specific and
correct attitude to adopt.
“Explanation” is merely the sort of understanding one looks for when one wants to
predict  and  control.  It  does  not  contrast  with  something  else  called
“understanding” as the abstract contrasts with the concrete, or the artificial with
the natural,  or  the “repressive” with the “liberating.”  To say that  something is
better “understood” in one vocabulary than another is always an ellipsis for the
claim that a description in the preferred vocabulary is more useful for a certain
purpose. (CP: 197)
16 The  vocabulary  that  Rorty  calls  “behaviourist”  is  useful  in  predicting  general
phenomena, while “evaluative” vocabulary is more useful in deliberating how to act.
However, the mistake made by supporters of both vocabularies is the same: they both
believe  that,  according  to  the  modern  scientific  background,  there  should  be  one
unique and coherent way of dealing with reality. According to Rorty, this conviction
means holding onto the idea that there is only one language capable of representing the
essence of reality and not accepting the pragmatist revision of the meaning of truth,
which,  in  Deweyan terms,  considers  vocabularies  as  useful  tools  to  cooperate  with
reality.15 From this point of view, there is no “essential connection or disconnection”
between moral and scientific considerations in the sense that it is neither necessary
nor necessarily more rational to answer questions that serve different purposes, either
the  prediction  and  control  of  nature  or  moral  behaviour,  with  one  and  the  same
vocabulary.
17 In this sense, the notion of truth put forth by James and Dewey proves to be central
because, as already mentioned, it is on the basis of the pragmatists’ radical questioning
of the criterion of adequately representing (copying) reality that Rorty develops his
argument and in which he anchors his construction of a philosophical alternative to
the foundational or epistemological notion of Philosophy. In addition, Rorty holds firm
to the pragmatist perspective for two reasons. First, it is a way to avoid the risk that he
envisages in a thoroughly hermeneutical critique of the conception of the scientific
method. The Diltheyan risk is precisely that of falling into an opposite, hermeneutical
yet  always  foundational  conception  that  derives  a  different  method  for  the  social
sciences from an essential difference between human beings and nature: “this protest
goes  too  far  when  […]  announcing  that  the  ontological  difference  dictates  a
methodological  difference”  (CP:  199).  Second,  the  social  science  debate  is  an
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opportunity for Rorty to highlight the relevance of the holistic path outlined by James
and Dewey’s pragmatism.16 Along the road traced by epistemological behaviourists and
classical pragmatists – and appropriated by Rorty for the “utility of its inspirational
upshot” (Malachowski 2013:  211) – it  is  possible to also prevent hermeneutics from
potentially drifting towards nihilistic  outcomes.17 Using the vocabulary of  American
“pluralism,” this pragmatist path reveals, according to Rorty, a purpose almost entirely
similar  to  that  of  continental  authors  such  as  Foucault  and  Nietzsche:  it  issues  at
warning  against  dogmatism.  However,  Rorty’s  perspective  is  melioristic and  in  this
respect more in line with the American tradition. Renouncing the transcendental, and
the idea that human nature does not necessarily imply a renunciation of the idea of
human solidarity,  Rorty argues that  “ F05BbF05Dourgeois  liberalism seems to me the best
example of this solidarity we have yet achieved, and Deweyan pragmatism the best
articulation of it” (CP: 207). In this sense, his preference for Deweyan vocabulary, as
well as for Dewey’s idea of “culture,” over Foucauldian vocabulary (and his conception
of “power”), is reasonable: “ F05BaF05D lthough Foucault and Dewey are trying to do the same
thing, Dewey seems to me to have done it better, simply because his vocabulary allows
room for unjustifiable hope, and an ungroundable but vital sense of human solidarity”
(CP: 208).18 Besides trying to ensure the common goal of demystifying the dogmatism of
culture and dominant strategies of power, pragmatist vocabulary also manages to keep
the ungrounded ideas of hope and solidarity alive.
 
4. Science and Morality: from Epistemology to
Pragmatist Hermeneutics
18 Rorty’s strategy of holding together unresolved aspects of philosophical perspectives is
emblematic  of  his  movement  from  epistemology  to  hermeneutics.  This  movement
especially  concerns Rorty’s  interlaced conception of  science and morality,  in  which
science  and  morality  mark  a  path  of  mutual  and  mutually  influential
(mis)understandings. From this perspective, the significance of particulars, historicity
and contingency is pivotal to Rorty’s construction of his pragmatist hermeneutics. It is
no  coincidence  that  his  moral  reflection  focuses  predominantly  on  the  “moral
significance” of personal details or idiosyncrasies as opposed to their supposed “moral
insignificance,”  as  preached  by  epistemological  science.  Before  addressing  Rorty’s
pragmatist  endorsement  of  hermeneutics,  and  finally  concluding  on  pluralism  and
meliorism  as  peculiar  aspects  that  characterize  his  naturalized  version  of
hermeneutics, we only want here to make a point about this strategy in the moral field.
Rorty’s  interpretation  of  Freud,  which  he  considers  an  indispensable  source  of
inspiration  for  his  moral  reflection,  is  another  illustration  of  what  we  have  called
Rorty’s eirenic strategy – the one he used to read pragmatism alternatively to Hook’s
positivistic  reading.  To accept  the  tension between positivism and hermeneutics  in
Freud’s  psychoanalysis  enables  Rorty  to  maintain  on  the moral  level  his  own
naturalistic,  anti-essentialist  view  while  at  the  same  time  espousing  a  postmodern
conception of the self  that is  ever open to reinterpretation and re-description (self-
creation).19 My claim is that both in considering science and morality, Rorty’s eirenic
approach turns out to be the result of his overcoming epistemology intended as the
need for a coherent and ultimately univocal worldview. To believe in the importance of
hanging together different perspectives is, for Rorty, the only way to fully appreciate
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their radicality and to understand what makes them so challenging (cf.  Rorty 1980:
185).
19 Rorty concludes his intellectual biography with a famous passage in which he writes
that he hopes for an era in which the question about absolutes no longer makes sense,
except insofar as it reveals the human inability “to live with one’s own finitude […] to
escape the historicity and contingency of [one’s] existence” (Rorty 2010: 23).  In this
short  text,  Rorty  also  considers  his  roughly  sketched  work  on  hermeneutics  in
Philosophy  and  the  Mirror  of  Nature (1979)  to  be  still  immature.  At  that  time,  he
contrasted “edifying philosophy” with “systematic philosophy,” and only later – after
having elaborated post-Hegelian European philosophy – was he able to join together
“postpositivistic analytic philosophy, American pragmatism, and Heidegger’s ‘history
of Being’” (Rorty 2010: 13). However, Rorty remains convinced even later of (at least)
the connection between science and ethics, and the related importance of the history of
ideas in understanding the associated philosophical issues. Moreover, he still appears
persuaded  of  the  inescapable  correlation  amongst  professionalized  philosophy,  the
application of the scientific method, and the attempt to solve ahistorical difficulties. To
put it briefly, already in that text, the roots of many of his later proposals on the need
for a therapeutic “deprofessionalization of philosophy” and to adopt Sellars’s lesson on
the  importance  of  the  history  of  philosophy  for  philosophy  (Rorty  2010:  15)  are
outlined.20
20 Explaining the meaning of the title of his book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty
begins  with  the  idea  that  images  and  metaphors  constitute  our  philosophical
convictions. The traditional conception of knowledge as “accuracy of representation”
and  the  related  idea  of  the  possibility  of  obtaining  more  accurate  and  precise
representations  using  “pure,  nonempirical  methods”  (PMN:  12)  derive  from  the
modern image of the mind as a mirror of nature. From the therapeutic perspective
adopted by Rorty, with which he proposes to deconstruct some obvious philosophical
assumptions  about  the  notions  of  mind,  knowledge and philosophy –  showing how
these  assumptions  have  been  historically  and  not  absolutely  constituted  –  the
distinction between analytic and continental philosophy also turns out to be one of
style  rather  than  method  or  principle.  By  adopting  Kuhn’s  well-known  distinction
between  normal  and  revolutionary  science,  Rorty  proposes  to  apply  the  same
perspective  to  analytic  philosophy,  as  Hans  Kögler  writes,  with  the  further  aim of
freeing the notion of abnormal discourse from all “idealized clothing” (Calcaterra &
Kögler 2020: 15; see also Gutting 2003: 47ff). Rorty considers analytic philosophy as a
contemporary variant of Cartesian and Kantian philosophy in that it shares the same
“self-image” as “still committed to the construction of a permanent, neutral framework
for  inquiry,  and thus  for  all  of  culture”  (PMN:  8).  Unlike  “historicist”  philosophers
(such as Wittgenstein, Dewey and Heidegger, who along with Kuhn, Sellars and Quine
are the “heroes” of this book), Rorty argues that one of the central aspects that unites
analytic philosophy and the Cartesian-Kantian philosophical tradition is precisely the
common “attempt to escape from history,” which for Rorty means “an attempt to find
nonhistorical conditions of any possible historical development” (PMN: 9).21
21 In the third section, Rorty opens his discussion of hermeneutics by pointing out that by
hermeneutics he means neither a method, nor a discipline, nor an alternative research
program to epistemology. Hermeneutics is, instead:
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an expression of hope that the cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will
not  be  filled  –  that  our  culture  should  become  one  in  which  the  demand  for
constraint and confrontation is no longer felt. The notion that there is a permanent
neutral framework whose “structure” philosophy can display is the notion that the
objects to be confronted by the mind, or the rules which constrain inquiry,  are
common to  all  discourse,  or  at  least  to  every  discourse  on  a  given  topic.  Thus
epistemology  proceeds  on  the  assumption  that  all contributions  to  a  given
discourse  are  commensurable.  Hermeneutics  is  largely  a  struggle  against  this
assumption. (PMN: 314-5)
22 Hermeneutics is taken as a battle flag against all attempts at commensuration since
every attempt at codification or comparison ultimately implies the need for a univocal
framework, one that may make it difficult to conceive of philosophy as “a voice in the
conversation of mankind” (PMN: 264). Embracing the pluralism of vocabularies, Rorty’s
critique addresses a monolithic framework of philosophy as well as the notion of truth
as  correspondence  to  facts  or,  as  Brandom  writes,  “the  notion  of  epistemically
privileged representations” (Brandom 2000: 159). In this regard, their exchange of ideas
is quite interesting. On the basis of Davidson’s distinction between causes and reasons,
Rorty introduces what Brandom renames “vocabulary vocabulary” or the vocabulary of
“normative discursive practices,” not with the intention of proposing an alternative to
the  vocabulary  of  causes,  but  rather  in  order  “to  replace  the  metavocabulary  of
representations” (Brandom 2000: 168), or what Brandom defines as “representationalist
totalitarianism”  (Brandom  2000:  170).  Rorty  acknowledges  that  he  considers  as
authoritarian those thinkers who conceive of perceptual experience as the model for
the hard sciences and who, consequently, distinguish conversations about hard facts
(e.g. photons) as superior to those about less hard facts (e.g. aesthetics). For Rorty these
are the “bad guys” or those he regards as “authoritarians.”
These guys do not agree with Brandom and myself  that  increased freedom and
richness of the Conversation is the aim of inquiry, but instead think that there is
the further aim of getting Reality right (as opposed to getting, for instance, snow,
photons, baseball, Cezanne and the best use of the term “fact” right). (Rorty 2000:
187)
23 Considering the ultimate aim of research to be the increase in the richness and freedom
of conversation instead of the need to get at reality in the right way is perhaps the key
to understanding Rorty’s anti-authoritarianism, and it is but another way of restating
the priority of freedom over truth.22 In this sense, Rorty echoes what he already wrote
in 1979, arguing against “Philosophy as a discipline capable of giving us a ‘right method
of seeking truth’.” There he explained that such a conception of philosophy undeniably
implied the request for a “permanent neutral framework of all possible inquiry,” to
which the Cartesian conception of “mind as Mirror of Nature” (PMN: 211-2) responded.
Moreover,  in  his  discussion  with  Brandom,  Rorty  reconfirms  his  instrumental
conception  of  vocabularies  by  accepting  the  former’s  naturalist  and  hermeneutic
reading according to which, for Rorty, not only are vocabularies “evolutionary coping
strategies” but, in an anti-reductionist and fully Deweyan sense, they “can do more
than just help us get what we already want. They also make it possible to frame and
formulate new ends” (Brandom 2000: 169). Rorty talks about the plasticity that affects
Dewey’s above-mentioned means-ends continuum, that is, the plasticity of meanings
that over time revises our vocabulary, which as a consequence enables us to articulate
our goals and desires in new ways. Here lies a radical overcoming of the reductionist
naturalistic perspective through a sort of pragmatist hermeneutics.
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24 In  this  brief  excursus  of  some  selected  texts  by  Rorty,  we  have  focused  on  the
relationship  between  his  conceptions  of  science  and  ethics  by  highlighting  his
understanding  of  the  scientific  method  and  the  methodological  distinction  made
between science  and morality  as  a  consequence  of  the  post-Cartesian metaphysical
interpretation of scientific success according to Rorty’s history of epistemology. What
clearly  emerges  is  the  conceptual  network  of  foundationalism-epistemology-
representationalism against which Rorty takes a firm stand for being a contemporary
form of authoritarianism or deprivation of intellectual freedom. In this respect, Rorty’s
response  to  McDowell’s  criticism  is  very  instructive.  In  fact,  Rorty  insists  that  his
strong  anti-authoritarianism  does  not  lead  him  to  confuse  the  regulative  ideal  of
wanting to do things right with the human inability to handle contingency. On the
contrary, in his view, this inability is the result of the Platonic fear of “plurality and
contingency.” Above all, he reaffirms his naturalistic approach as a way to move past
this philosophical and cultural impasse: “I think that the way out of both Cartesian and
Platonism is to view human nomoi human languages and practices – as natural as the
beaver’s  teeth,  and  equally  in  touch  (causal  touch,  rather  than  any  sort  of
‘answerability’ touch) with the world” (Rorty 2000b: 123).
25 As  Brandom  rightly  suggests,  Rorty  –  like  James,  we  should  add  –  criticizes  “the
ontological privilege and unique authority of science” (Brandom 2000: xiii), considering
science, in Deweyan and Quinean terms, “as one more human activity, rather than as
the place at which human beings encounter a ‘hard,’ nonhuman reality” (CIS: 4).23 The
object  of  his  polemic  is,  therefore,  not  science,  but  scientism:  “the  philosophical
credentials  of  taking  the  practical  success  of  science  as  reason  to  understand  its
vocabulary as putting us in closer touch with reality than others” (Brandom 2000: xiv).
Just as for classical  pragmatists,  and particularly for James,  for Rorty,  the target of
criticism  was  the  uncritical  acceptance  of  the  new  positivist  idola  tribus,24 namely
science and its results, in an absolute and absolutely decontextualized and apparently
disinterested way. Among James’s and Rorty’s’ motivations for this battle, a common
one  can  be  detected  in  the  profound  moral  concern  that  inspires  these  two  “
philosophers  of  agency  and  commitment”  (Voparil  2016:  2),  and  great  experts  in
epistemology.25 Their  reflections  on  epistemology  and  their  moral  concerns  are
somehow  deeply  intertwined.  As  clearly  put  by  Furlog,  Rorty’s  reformulation  of
epistemology  or  normal  discourse  “lies  well  within  the  hermeneutic  circle,”  for  it
“describes a language so well-entrenched in human practice that it can be used ‘as if’ it
were grounded in certainty, whereas, in fact, it is only more familiar to us than other
discourses” (Furlog 1988: 493). Rorty’s recourse to hermeneutics expresses his hope to
show how concretely fallible and contingent both old and new forms of dogmatism or
authoritarianism are with their imposition of unnecessary limits on the advancement
of inquiry, understood as the advancement of the conversation of humanity. In this
regard, concrete deliberation – that is, deliberation constrained by the contingency of
natural and social reality – constitutes one of the central aspects of the “patterns” of
scientific  and  moral  inquiry  promoted  by  classical  pragmatists  and  profoundly
endorsed by Rorty: “[f]or the pragmatists, the pattern of all inquiry – scientific as well
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as  moral  –  is  deliberation  concerning  the  relative  attractions  of various  concrete
alternatives” (CP: 164). 
26 As mentioned earlier,  Rorty’s  recovery of  pragmatism is  also due to its  capacity to
provide  a  framework  for  heretofore  ungrounded  hope  and  solidarity.  Solidarity
becomes  his  alternative  to  an  epistemological  conception  of  science  in  search  of
permanent results  and objectivity.  In his  reshaping of  scientific  vocabulary,  Rorty’s
move  from  objectivity  to  solidarity  implies,  according  to  Calcaterra’s  reading,  a
reliance on the intersubjective category of suffering. On a moral level, this category is
based on the fact that it is precisely through acquaintance with others, by listening to
their narratives, that it is possible for us to become sympathetic to the suffering of
others – James also expresses this idea in his well-known text,  cited by Rorty, on a
certain  blindness  in  human  beings  (CIS:  38).  According  to  Calcaterra,  solidarity  is
therefore, on an epistemological level, the criterion of intersubjectivity on which the
communitarian statute of scientific research relies (cf. Calcaterra 2019: 69ff).
27 In conclusion, what I claim is that Rorty’s hermeneutic turn in science and ethics takes
the path of a more and more deliberate reshaping of hermeneutics along the lines of
the pragmatist tradition. As clearly stated by Bouveresse, however, Rorty was not in
search of  any “ecumenical  consensus” between continental  and analytic  philosophy
and  their  methods  (Bouveresse  2013:  8;  CP:  225-6).26 Both  his  dismissal  of
“methodology”27 and his eirenic strategy are part of Rorty’s rejection of epistemology
in favour of hermeneutics and his proposal for the renovation of scientific and moral
reflection. From this perspective, his twofold adoption of hermeneutics (in science and
ethics) appears as two photograms of Rorty’s robust antiauthoritarian stance28 or what
Voparil  brilliantly  called  “antiauthoritarian  fallibilism,”  considering  it  as  “an
instantiation of the pluralist temperament that James most valued” (Voparil 2016: 2).
Voparil has recently written on the commonalities between James and Rorty focusing
on  their  similar  ethical  views.29 These  hinge  on  a  “melioristic  ethics  of  belief  that
foregrounds  a  distinctly  pragmatic  interrelation  of  choice,  commitment,  and
responsibility” (Voparil 2016: 2).
28 If  it  is  quite  clear  that  Rorty’s  relation to  classical  pragmatism is  characterized by
important continuities and interesting new developments, it is even more evident, that,
in talking about hermeneutics (particularly in PMN), “Rorty selectively appropriates
Gadamer’s thought for his own neo-pragmatist aims and concerns” (Bouma-Prediger
1989:  313).30 It  is  precisely  along  the  lines  of  an  appropriative  reshaping  of
hermeneutics that I have suggested talking about Rorty’s pragmatist hermeneutics. As
other scholars have shown, Rorty understands philosophy as an ongoing conversation
that is expected to be useful for and committed to existential issues. It is to this extent
that he appropriates and reframes, sometimes in an unorthodox way, what previous
philosophers have achieved, considering their views in the light of the history of the
human society we happen to be part of. His preference for hermeneutics thus takes the
form of pragmatist naturalism as it is integrally shaped, or nourished, by melioristic and
pluralistic perspectives. These two main perspectives are particularly appreciable in his
understanding of the interlacing of science and ethics. As I have shown, pluralism is a
valid alternative to any scientific and moral dogmatism, while meliorism is what saves
continental hermeneutics from what Rorty sees as its congenital lack of hope, lack of
utopianism.  This  reshaping  of  pragmatist  –  read  “experimental  [and]  fallibilist”  –
naturalism  may  warrant  further  exploration  to  prove  both  Rorty’s  strong  cultural
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connection to the American philosophical  tradition and his  commitment to making
such a pluralistic voice relevant again to contemporary conversations.
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NOTES
1. In a footnote, Rorty defines “eirenic” as his attitude of rejecting any definitive philosophical
resolution between a materialistic and a hermeneutical reading of Freud (EHO: 151). 
2. For an accurate reading of classical pragmatism in the light of experimentalism see Trevor
Pearce (2020); on the influence of experimentalism on Dewey’s theory of democratic institutions
see Frega (2019; in particular, chapter 7 “A Democratic Experimentalist Theory of Institutions”:
269-318). 
3. As president of the APA’s Eastern Division in 1979, Rorty played a relevant role during the
pluralist revolt against the domination of analytical philosophers. See Gross (2008: 216ff).
4. Hook defines  invariants as  the scientific  reasons for  which one does or  does not  attribute
validity to hypotheses and variants as the historical and contingent factors, such as the presence
of other clues and evidence, that strengthen the scientific reasons for “believing an hypothesis”
(ORT: 65).
5. On Dewey’s conception of method see Sydney Ratner (1992); Gregory Pappas (2008). 
6. “Attributions of reality or truth are, on the view I share with James, compliments we pay to
entities  or  beliefs  that  have won their  spurs,  paid  their  way,  proved themselves  useful,  and
therefore  been  incorporated  into  accepted  social  practices.  When  these  practices  are  being
contested, it is of no use to say that reality or truth is on the side of one of the contestants. For
such claims will always be mere table-thumping, not serious contributions to cultural politics.
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Another way to put James’  point  is  to  say that  truth and reality exist  for  the sake of  social
practices, rather than vice versa” (PCP: 6-7). On Rorty’s priority of politics on science see Kremer
(2009).
7. It is worth clarifying that Rorty is well aware of the relationship between methodology and
ontology, and it is from this perspective that we can explain his opposition to let’s say a priori
methods, namely those methods that already presuppose a fixed conception of reality. On the
contrary, because of his endorsement of Dewey’s conception, Rorty is not against the notion of
methodology as  it  is  established in  the progress  of  research and modified according to  new
discoveries.
8. With respect to the issue of the plurality of alternative theories and logics Rorty claims are
pragmatic,  one  author  he  could  have  taken  into  greater  consideration  is  Clarence  I.  Lewis.
However, it is clear that Lewis’s research into developing a rule to choose between alternative
theoretical paradigms is quite far from Rorty’s theory. The latter probably would not have talked
about rules and in any case would have relied on a pragmatic choice between paradigms: we
choose what works best in a certain context and for certain purposes.
9. On the problematic situation in and the importance of the organic circuit for Dewey’s theory of
evaluation,  see  Santarelli:  “what  we  attribute  value  to  is  the  possible  object  of  an  overall
reassessment in a situation of crisis, conflict or disharmony. Through a critical evaluation, our
provisional  aims –  for  example,  our wishes and interests  –  are considered as  a  means to an
ulterior end. Dewey’s theory of evaluation relies on an original and sophisticated conception of
the means-ends relationship, based on the logical device of the organic circuit” (Santarelli 2019:
76; our translation). See also Calcaterra & Frega (2015).
10. Letson  criticizes  Rorty’s  understanding  of  social  science  by  suggesting  that  another
conception of method can be provided instead of his view of it as “the possession of the key to
nature’s  secrets.”  If  by method one means “simply something like approach,  then Rorty,  and
indeed any pragmatist, need feel no compunctions about referring to method” (Letson 1995: 44).
11. See James (1907; 1909). 
12. Essential Peirce (vol. 1: 1-55).
13. As Rouse comments, Rorty claimed that the meaning of “realism” also depends on which
“antirealist” doctrine is considered by realists: “‘[a]ntirealism’ is not a single doctrine, but an
umbrella term for a family of views that define the aspirations of science in terms of specific
human capacities or interests. The significance of such views depends upon which capacities or
interests are given prominence for a philosophy of science and how the goals of science are
supposed to be fixed by those capacities or interests” (ORT: 49).
14. Among recent works on Rorty’s conception of ethics see Voparil (2020) and Marchetti (2019).
See also Curtis (2015).
15. “Dewey thought that if he could break down this notion, if scientific inquiry could be seen as
adapting and coping rather than copying, the continuity between science, morals, and art would
become apparent” (CP: 86).
16. “On my view, James and Dewey were not only waiting at the end of the dialectical road which
analytic philosophy travelled, but are waiting at the end of the road which, for example, Foucault
and Deleuze are currently travelling” (CP: xviii).
17. In  an interview from 1982,  recently republished by Voparil  and Bernstein,  Rorty further
clarifies this aspect:  “What I  find disturbing about the fashionable French is that they aren’t
utopian. They hold out no hope. I think that their position is an over-reaction” (Rorty 2010b:
496).
18. Like Foucault, Dewey renounces the idea that there is one vocabulary intrinsic to Nature, as
well as the idea of a transcendental subject, yet this does not prevent him from appropriating
terms that have belonged, with other meanings, to these traditions of thought. By redefining
these terms, such as the “will to truth,” in a “creative” and non-possessive way, the pragmatist
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can use them in her vocabulary, thus giving due place to a whole plurality of emotions, desires,
and expectations that are characteristic of the richness and diversity of human phenomenology.
Like  the  behaviourist  and  hermeneutic  ones,  the  pragmatist  vocabulary  is  simply  another
vocabulary. Nevertheless, as a “pluralist” vocabulary, it allows one to realize and adhere to the
ideal needs of concrete life–hope and solidarity – which makes it preferable in Rorty’s eyes.
19. From this perspective, the moral obligation to seek self-knowledge turns out to be an aesthetic
exploration of ourselves in pursuit of self-enrichment, rather than a foundationalist search for
our propulsive “true center” (EHO: 148). For an analysis of Rorty’s and Ricœur’s understanding of
the Freudian unconscious, see Bella & Santarelli (2019).
20. In the previously mentioned interview from 1982, Rorty reaffirms his admiration for James
and Dewey and talks about his effort to free pragmatism from the misunderstandings caused by
professionalized philosophy: “it’s a question of putting pragmatism into better shape after thirty
years of super professionalism” (Rorty 2010b: 495). 
21. On Rorty’s naturalism and its relation to Kantianism, Brandom maintains that the “Trojan
horse” in Rorty’s naturalism is his adoption (via Sellars) of Kant’s distinction between causation
and justification: “[i]n his reliance on this fundamental distinction, Rorty is a Kantian, even as he
deploys this tool to criticize the epistemological tradition Kant represents” (Brandom 2000: xv). 
22. “Figures like Nietzsche, William James, Freud, Proust, and Wittgenstein illustrate what I have
called ‘freedom as the recognition of contingency.’ […] such recognition is the chief virtue of the
members of a liberal society, and that the culture of such a society should aim at curing us of our
‘deep  metaphysical  need’”  (CIS:  46).  Along  this  line,  Ramberg  reads  Rorty’s  fight  against
metaphysics as an expression of his radically pragmatist anti-authoritharianism. See Ramberg
(2008).
23. On the continuity between science and philosophy, Rorty writes: “[m]y discussion of Quine
has pressed his words with tiresome literalness. Quine probably does not care about the fate of
the word ‘epistemology.’ What he does care about, perhaps, is his Deweyan position that science
and philosophy are continuous–not to be viewed as having different methods or subjects. […]
Dewey and Wittgenstein have in common their view that a natural quest for understanding has
been run together, by modern philosophers, with an unnatural quest for certainty” (PMN: 228).
24. “For  positivism  preserved  a  god  in  its  notion  of  Science  (and  its  notion  of  ‘scientific
philosophy’),  the  notion of  a  portion of  culture  where we touched something not  ourselves,
where we found Truth naked, relative to no description” (CP: xliii).
25. As Malachowski recently reminds us concerning Rorty’s reading of James, “one of the main
bones of contention is Rorty’s attempt to lift his pragmatism out of the empiricist tradition and
turn it into a strong form of anti-epistemology” (Malachowski 2013: 208). 
26. Gross wonders how Rorty could reconcile, especially in the early seventies, his “analytic style
with his sense of the importance of intellectual history and pluralism?” His answer is that Rorty,
at that time, conceived himself as a “‘therapeutic positivist’ – as someone who recognized, as
many of his analytic colleagues did not, that philosophical problems are bequeathed to us by
culture and that, although linguistic analysis may be essential for helping us see through some of
these problems, it does so not as a method that unlocks timeless truths but simply as a technique
for disposing of cultural paradoxes” (Gross 2008: 197-8).
27. This  applies  mainly to the scientific  method,  which is  not  specific  in its  application and
merely an “expression of the urge for ‘the secure path of a science’” (CP: 226).
28. Rorty points out the convergence on anti-authoritarianism between James, Brandom, and
himself as follows: “The question at issue between James and his opponents boiled down to this:
is there an authority beyond that of society which society should acknowledge – an authority
such as  God,  or  Truth,  or  Reality?  Brandom’s  account  of  assertions  as  assumptions  of  social
responsibilities leaves no room for such an authority, and so he sides with James” (PCP: 8).
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29. Voparil  underlines that  despite the “commonalities  between his  [Rorty’s]  own views and
James’s antirepresentationalism, pluralism, and tolerance,” in Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism
Rorty “doesn’t recognize James’s own antiauthoritarianism; instead, Rorty praises Dewey for his
greater attentiveness to this issue” (Voparil 2016: 8).
30. On the differences between Rorty and Gadamer see also Rockmore (1997). 
ABSTRACTS
Richard Rorty has long been perceived and interpreted as a provocative and groundbreaking
philosopher. However, an approach that he calls ‘eirenic’ emerges in his writings. This eirenism
should  not  be  confused  with  a  form  of  sophisticated  relativism,  but  rather  it  should  be
understood  as  a  consequence  of  the  profound  anti-foundational  conviction  and  anti-
authoritarian sentiment that feeds his thought, as well as his reading of the relations of science
and  ethics.  In  this  article,  I  focus  on  Rorty’s  recovery  of  pragmatism  and  “pragmatist
hermeneutics”  by  considering  his  understanding  of  science  and  ethics  as  deeply  interlaced.
Rorty’s perspective on this issue is  inspired by Dewey’s and James’s conception of a holistic-
syncretic pragmatism. His project takes into account not only the main cultural trends of logical
empiricism and continental philosophy, but also the existential needs they conveyed – that is,
the search for objectivity and the meaning of life, respectively. The Rortyan proposal of an anti-
ideological, historicist or post-positivist reformulation of the conception of scientific rationality
as not opposed to ethics aligns with Jamesian efforts to confront scientific dogmatism by
questioning  the  key  notion  of  truth.  Within  a naturalistic  hermeneutical  framework,  Rorty
contests the ontological need for necessary connections or disconnections between moral and
scientific discourse. In this sense, the conception of ethics as having to do with what is personal,
historical  and  “irrational”  contrasts  with  the  notion  of  scientific  rationality  elaborated  in
modernity as something that, unlike morality, is able to escape human finitude and contingency.
Appreciating  the  Jamesian  (and  Deweyan)  element  in  Rorty’s  pragmatist  hermeneutics  may
contribute to renovating the current lines of debate around Rorty and pragmatism, especially by
reevaluating Rorty’s strong cultural connection to the American philosophical tradition and his
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